We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one which is di¢ cult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not e¢ cient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.
Introduction
Since the beginning of time, every monetary economy has had to deal with the issue of counterfeit currency. In spite of this robust observation, to date there is no model that provides an understanding of the value of genuine money and the boundaries to counterfeiting. 1 In this paper, we identify the basic ingredients that a theory of counterfeiting requires. In particular, we
We have bene…ted from the discussions at the New York Fed Workshop on Payments, the SED Meetings, the SAET Meetings and the Cleveland Fed Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance. 1 Counterfeiting activities are pervasive, having a tendency to become more attractive the more valuable a currency becomes. Adoption of monitoring processes that increase detection rates and counterfeiting costs is the usual response, but it is evident that new technologies also become available for the provision of crime itself.
view counterfeiting as a second-best outcome, which arises because monitoring resources are scarce. A key insight is that a theory of counterfeiting is essentially a theory of private money-albeit a private money that is a rather undesirable substitute for the real thing.
One can think of a counterfeit note as a good that is produced and priced in a competitive environment: we do not take this approach. We believe that a purely technological explanation for counterfeiting-one that uses classic price theory to predict the value of money-is a dead end. For the fundamental value of money-and its substitutes-comes from their ability to overcome exchange di¢ culties and not from the scarcity of paper and ink needed to produce them. As a result, an attractive theory of private money should describe formally what problem money is solving, what its exchange value is, and to what extent substitutes can be adopted or, in the case of counterfeiting, tolerated. This is what we mean by the boundaries of counterfeiting.
It is important to emphasize that private money, or for that matter credit, is a response to an opportunity that may arise; in the case of credit, the opportunity is the existence of would-be borrowers and lenders and enforcement devices. And counterfeiting is no exception. In modern economies, resources are allocated for some transactions-typically high-value transactions-to ensure that settlement is seamless. And seamless settlement requires a high level of monitoring. For example, stock market purchases are settled through broker accounts and house purchases are settled by escrow accounts. These types of accounts are designed to detect counterfeiting activity almost surely; more to the point, these types of high-value transactions are not the kind of opportunities that counterfeiters can use to successfully put their notes into circulation. 2 Since monitoring is costly, society will allocate its scarce monitoring resources to important, high-value transactions, leaving relatively small-value transactions less protected.
The notion that limited monitoring is necessary for the essentiality of money is a reasonably old one, dating back at least to Ostroy (1973) . A more recent formulation appears in Kocherlakota (1998) , who emphasizes that holding money constitutes tangible evidence of an earlier socially-desirable activity; that is, it indicates that the current holder of money has in the past traded valuable goods for money. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) take it a step further by introducing imperfect monitoring of agents in a way that gives rise to the coexistence of money and credit transactions. In their model, the notion of imperfect monitoring concerns the ability-or inabilityto record the actions that people take. In this paper, we pursue another avenue: imperfect monitoring applies not to people but to the attributes of the means of payments. In particular, whether the means of payments are recognized as being either genuine or counterfeit.
A more general model of multiple assets-which may include undesirable ones such as counterfeit money-would allow ranges for monitoring of both people's actions and assets' attributes. Society would set up trading institutions, with an eye on monitoring costs, which ultimately generates a spectrum of exchange opportunities, where large transactions will be heavily monitored and small ones will not. Individuals would respond by issuing questionable quality assets for only the small-value transactions. In this paper, we focus exclusively on small-value transactions and assume that it is only possible to imperfectly monitor assets. We tackle this by amending the basic random-matching model of money-which has only one asset-to allow for a mechanism-design analysis of the coexistence of genuine and counterfeited money.
For reasons of tractability, we preserve the anonymity of individuals and restrict attention to pairwise exchanges, where money holdings are restricted to either zero or one units. We ask what is the best incentive-feasible response to counterfeiting? Because we describe an optimum, we can verify whether the coexistence of counterfeits and genuine money is a robust phenomenon. Indeed, we …nd a necessary condition for robustness: counterfeiting opportunities must be distributed unevenly across individuals.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the environment and our concept of implementability are presented. In section 3, we discuss optimality. In section 4, we provide concluding remarks, which include comments on the existing literature and a discussion of why we choose not to use lotteries. The appendix contains all the proofs and additional algebra for solving the model.
The environment and the equilibrium concept
Our model modi…es the environments of Trejos and Wright (1995) , Shi (1995) and Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) to allow for the costly production of an alternative medium of exchange. We will refer to lawful money or outside money as …at notes, and the alternative as counterfeit notes.
The environment
Time is discrete and the horizon is in…nite. A unit measure population is divided into N …xed types according to the goods they can produce and consume, where N 3. There are N types of perishable goods. An i-type individual specializes in consuming only good i and producing only good i + 1 (modulo N ). Individuals maximize discounted expected utility. Period utility for an i-type individual who produces a counterfeit note is u(x) y ! and u (x) y if he does not, where x is the amount of good i consumed, y is the amount of good i + 1 produced and ! is the utility cost of producing a counterfeit note. The function u is continuous, concave, di¤erentiable, with u(0) = 0, u 0 (0) = +1, and u 0 (+1) = 0. The discount factor is 2 (0; 1). Individuals are unable to commit to future actions, and histories of their actions are private information. In order to facilitate trade, a durable object, such as money, is required. We assume that individuals can hold either one unit of money or no money at all. If an individual holds a unit of money, it may be either a …at note or a counterfeit note. The economy is endowed with a …xed stock of …at money, 1 2 (0; 1), to be chosen by a planner. Fiat money is perfectly durable and lasts forever. Counterfeit money, however, is not perfectly durable: In each period there is a …xed probability that a counterfeit note disintegrates.
Each period has two subperiods. At the beginning of the …rst subperiod, each individual draws an idiosyncratic realization for a nonnegative utility cost of counterfeiting !. The cost of counterfeiting, !, is modeled as the realization of a random variable, identically and independently distributed over time and across individuals, according to the cumulative distribution function F , assumed to have support in a bounded interval of R + . Except for a degenerate case considered in one part of the analysis, the function F is assumed to be continuous and di¤erentiable, with F (0) = 0 and F 0 (0) < +1.
After individuals learn their current-period !, those who are not holding any type of money will either produce a counterfeit note or not. After counterfeit notes are produced, with probability 2 [0; 1], a counterfeit note-either an old note or a newly produced one-disintegrates. In the second subperiod, individuals meet randomly and in pairs. In a single-coincidence meeting-e.g., a meeting between i-type and i 1-type individuals-a perishable good may be produced and consumed if the buyer-the i-type individual-has a unit of money and the seller-the i 1-type individual-does not. The seller is unable to distinguish between a unit of counterfeit money and …at money at the time of trade. After trade occurs, the seller learns about the type of money-…at or counterfeit-that he has just acquired and this information remains private. As a result, buyers are eventually informed about the quality of the money they hold.
Allocations
The planner's problem is to maximize the average ex ante utility of individuals, by choosing an allocation in some class. We restrict attention to a class with symmetry and stationarity properties. We further restrict attention to allocations in which counterfeit notes trade for the same level of output as a …at note, so that only "one price"is observed.
The average utility in the planner's objective is taken with regard to the endogenous distribution of individuals, as indexed by their money holdings. The planner's maximization problem includes participation constraints, which are dictated by individual rationality. As in Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), we assume that individuals cannot coordinate on defection, so the participation constraints only re ‡ect the possibility of an individual defection.
The distribution of money at the beginning of the …rst subperiod is given by = ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 ), where 0 represents the fraction of individuals holding no money, 1 is the fraction of individuals holding a …at note and 2 is the fraction of individuals holding a counterfeit note. The beginning-of-the…rst-subperiod value functions associated with the various money holdings are denoted by w = (w 0 ; w 1 ; w 2 ), where the notation should be obvious. The beginning-of-the-second-subperiod value functions-which are evaluated after the counterfeiting costs are incurred and after a fraction of counterfeit notes disintegrate, but before individuals are matched-are denoted by v = (v 0 ; v 1 ; v 2 ).
We anticipate that a necessary condition for optimality will, in part, be characterized by the existence of a cuto¤ counterfeiting cost, !, such that only individuals who do not hold money and draw an ! < ! will choose to produce a counterfeit note. As well, we anticipate that in any allocation, holders of money never dispose of their monies in the …rst subperiod: There is no point for a holder of a counterfeit note to dispose of it at the beginning of the …rst subperiod only to (possibly) produce another one that has an identical chance of being disintegrated. As well, since a …at note has no chance of being disintegrated and has value, a holder of a …at note will never dispose of it. Notice that the realization ! for an individual is not a state variable at the second subperiod because counterfeiting decisions have already been made in the …rst subperiod.
In a steady state, in ‡ows and out ‡ows into the di¤erent money holding states "cancel out"; this implies that in a steady state the distribution of money holdings at the beginning of the …rst subperiod, = ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 ), also describes the distribution of money holdings at the beginning of the second subperiod. The stationarity requirement for ( ; !) is as follows. In the steady state, the amount of counterfeit notes produced at the beginning of the …rst subperiod, 0 F ( !), must equal the amount that disintegrates at the end of the …rst subperiod, 0 F ( !) + 2 . With the understanding that is a probability measure, ( i 0 and 0 + 1 + 2 = 1), an allocation ( ; y; !) is said to be stationary if it satis…es
In summary, we assume a class of outcomes that are stationary and symmetric across consumption/production types and states. We de…ne an allocation to be a list ( ; y; !) satisfying (1), where money holdings are distributed according to , both monies trade for y-the level of output produced and consumed in single-coincidence meetings-and counterfeit notes are created according to !.
Implementability
Allocation ( ; y; !) is implementable if it satis…es individual rationality requirements. Individual rationality for producers of consumption goods takes the form of the participation constraint
since the producer can only use his knowledge about to infer the probability he is receiving …at or counterfeit money. The di¤erence w i w 0 represents the increase in expected discounted utility associated with an individual starting the …rst subperiod with money i = 1; 2 compared to starting with no money at all. The bracketed term on the right-hand side of (2) represents the increase in expected discounted utility associated with accepting a unit of money in trade in exchange for some output. Since a producer receives this bene…t beginning the next period, the value of this bene…t (today) must be discounted by . The left-hand side of (2) represents the cost of receiving this bene…t, i.e., the cost of producing output y. Hence, the seller will produce y if the bene…t exceeds y. Since we assume that …at and counterfeit money trade for the same level of output, individual rationality for the consumer is simply u(y)
The consumer knows whether he is holding a counterfeit or …at note; he will only trade the note if the bene…t of surrendering the note, which is given by the left-hand side of (3), exceeds the cost, which is given by the right-hand side (3). 3 Notice that there is an individual rationality constraint associated with the production of counterfeit notes, i.e., ! < !. We can be more explicit about the critical cuto¤ !. The bene…t of creating a counterfeit, w 2 v 0 , can be simpli…ed to read
where is the probability that a counterfeit note disintegrates. Therefore, the cuto¤ value for !, !, for which ! ! produces a counterfeit note, satis…es
The allocation ( ; y; !) is implementable if there exists nonnegative (w; v) satisfying participation constraints (2)- (4), as well as the standard Bellman equation (which is described in the appendix).
The planner' s objective
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the average utility, P i i w i , associated to any implementable allocation ( ; y; !), is proportional to
Equation (5) de…nes our ex-ante welfare criteria. The term
represents the probability that a good is traded for money. The probability that a particular money holder (buyer) is matched with a seller who produces the good that he desires is 1 N times 0 , and the total measure of potential buyers is 1 + 2 = 1 0 . The term
is sometimes referred to as the extensive margin. In each single-coincidence match, total period utility ‡ow is u(y) y; this ‡ow is sometimes referred to as the intensive margin. Finally, in each …rst subperiod, there is a measure of agents without money, 
Optimality
We demonstrate in the appendix how the choice of an optimal allocation can be separated into steps: …rst a margin ( 0 ; y) is selected; next a stationary allocation ( ; y; !) is constructed from ( 0 ; y); …nally, if the allocation satis…es the producer's participation constraint, then it is shown to be implementable. The optimum is the one that maximizes the ex ante welfare criteria among the implementable allocations. There are two attractive features of this algorithm. On the one hand it allows an easy comparison with the optimum of the standard model, where counterfeiting is ignored. This is convenient because the algebra necessary to derive the producer participation constraint with counterfeiting is quite lengthy, and the comparison with the standard case provides a simple check on our algebra. Incidentally, we have chosen the sequence of events so that the -shock happens before trade. Hence, even if a subset of individuals have low counterfeiting costs, then, as approaches unity, counterfeiting does not take place, and the optimum is identical to that of the standard model.
On the other hand, under some conditions, we can show that the optimum problem can be solved on the ( 0 ; y)-space itself. We can show (in the appendix) that both the objective (5) and producer participation constraint are well de…ned for a given margin and !. Moreover, we can also show that when F is uniform, ! is uniquely de…ned for a given margin. The optimum problem is, however, not necessarily transformed into the maximization of (5) subject to only the producer participation constraint because, unlike the standard model, not all margins yield stationary allocations in our model. Speci…cally, if, for given 0 , the level of output y is su¢ ciently high, then the associated ! may generate, from (1), a 2 > 1 0 , which violates the nonnegativity of 1 . As a result, in addition to the producer participation constraint, the nonnegativity requirement , then inequality (6) is always satis…ed. This observation is useful because, as we show, when is su¢ ciently high, the optimum is characterized by 0 < . Hence, inequality (6) is satis…ed in a large neighborhood of the standard model (where the standard model has = 1) when is high. Note also that reductions in 0 relax the nonnegativity constraint (because it also reduces the value of money, it also reduces !).
Since the details associated with solving the model are not crucial to understanding the main results, we leave these derivations to the appendix. 4 The main result is divided into two propositions. The …rst is Proposition 1 Assume that F (!) > 0 for all ! > 0, and let y be the unique maximizer of the intensive margin u(y) y. Then any optimum ( ; y; !) features 2 > 0. Moreover, if is su¢ ciently high, then 0 < 1 2 and y < y .
The proposition thus states a su¢ cient condition for which the optimum features a second-best allocation with counterfeiting, and it is that for some people, the cost of counterfeiting has to be arbitrarily small. 5 It also states that when there is enough patience-so that the participation constraint for the producer can be ignored-both the extensive and intensive margins will be distorted, in contrast to the standard model (without counterfeiting), where the optimum would set 0 = 1 2 and y = y . The deviation from the …rst-best optimum quantity of money is biased towards in ‡ation.
The basic idea underlying proposition 1 is that the planner is aware that a higher value of money encourages more counterfeiting, and that some counterfeiting should be tolerated up to the point that the distortions it imposes on the economy become too high.
In numerical simulations with F uniform, we also found that y < y is robust to reductions in . When the participation constraint binds, reductions in y below y tend to reduce ! and the value of counterfeits. We are unable to prove the result in general because we cannot establish how changes in ! a¤ect the participation constraint for arbitrary parameter values.
We now argue that, except in some extreme cases, the planner can and will essentially eliminate counterfeiting when the distribution of shocks is degenerate. The basic idea is as follows. Consider a perturbation of an implementable allocation with positive counterfeiting when the distribution of shocks is degenerate and individuals without money are indi¤erent between counterfeiting or not. Keeping the margin ( 0 ; y) constant, consider a perturbation that reduces the measure of those creating counterfeits at all dates, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the measure of those who hold genuine money. Because, as we show, ! is determined by ( 0 ; y) aloneand thus invariant to the ratio 2 = 1 -the indi¤erence to counterfeiting is maintained. Indeed, the value of holding one unit of genuine money is not a¤ected because consumption opportunities are fully described by ( 0 ; y). Likewise, the value of holding a counterfeit does not change. Because the ratio 2 = 1 is reduced, the participation constraint for the producer is weakened and the perturbation is thus implementable. But because 2 is reduced, the ‡ow of resources lost to counterfeiting is also reduced, and social welfare is, therefore, increased. The argument implies that, under homogenous counterfeiting opportunities, the optimum either has none or all of the individuals without money counterfeiting. We consider the …rst case-(i) below-to be the relevant one. 
, and the associated discounted utilities solving the Bellman equation are nonnegative.
The …rst part of proposition 2 tells us that if is su¢ ciently high, then it is not possible to have ! >!; hence, there cannot be counterfeiting. Intuitively, if the probability of having a counterfeit bill con…scated is high, then the critical cost of counterfeiting, !, will be extremely low; in fact, it will be lower than the actual cost of counterfeiting,!. If, on the other hand, is su¢ ciently low, then in order to ensure that 1 is nonnegative, 0 must also be su¢ ciently low. But if both and 0 are low, there will be very few trading opportunities and, hence, it will not be possible to have ! >!. The second part of proposition 2 describes implementable allocations when all individuals without money choose to counterfeit. In particular, the proposition suggests that an allocation with = ( ; 0; 1 ) and y = ! can be implementable if! is not too high, so that discounted utilities are nonnegative.
Final remarks
There is a small literature on counterfeiting, 6 and the papers closest to ours are Green and Weber (1996) and Nosal and Wallace (2007) . In the former, the supply of counterfeit notes is essentially exogenous. Both papers assume that the cost of counterfeiting is homogeneous and neither emphasizes optimality. The focus of the latter paper is on the emergence of separating prices when traders can use lotteries. We conclude by defending our assumptions of no lotteries and 0-1 money holdings.
Recall that lotteries were introduced in monetary theory to approximate divisible money. Absent lotteries, models with indivisible money holdings could predict ine¢ cient trade outcomes-too much output is producedand such a result is a direct implication of the indivisibility. But this is not a relevant issue here. First, in our model, output production is never ine¢ ciently high. Second, and more importantly, counterfeiting money, as opposed to wine, is about the attempt to misrepresent the quality of a given indivisible object.
One can think of Nosal and Wallace (2007) as presenting a fundamental result about signaling in pairwise trades, where signaling requires the use of lotteries. Although we do believe that signaling is a relevant issue for counterfeiting-for example, see footnote 2-we have, as a …rst step, focused on lightly monitored exchanges and have "ignored" the more heavily monitored transactions where signalling is relevant.
In practice, there are large costs associated with distributing counterfeit bills in an economy. For example, one would not purchase a $600 suit with 30 counterfeit $20 bills; instead, one would use a very small number of counterfeits at any one time to avoid detection. For this reason, we feel comfortable with our 0-1 money holding structure. More generally, the existence of monitoring costs will restrict the scope of counterfeit or private money usage, relegating it to relatively small trades. Because trading opportunities are bounded, as are pro…ts, private money can coexist with outside money. This idea has been laid out in a random-matching model by .
Future research could expand our model in the direction of allowing small and large transactions, as well as the allocation of scarce monitoring technologies across them. Such an extension should yield predictions about the formation of markets where large transactions become safer. At the same time, it could o¤er insights about the supremacy of money issued by the government for settling large transactions as a result of its recognizability.
APPENDIX A1 The Bellman equation, incentive constraints and proof to Proposition 1
The possibility of counterfeiting forces a higher dimensionality of stationary allocations with respect to those of the standard monetary environment. Implementable distributions of money are now tied to the level of output, y, insofar as changes in the value of (…at) money-which can be brought about by changes in y-a¤ect the supply of counterfeits. By contrast, in the standard model with holdings in f0; 1g, the distribution of money holdings can be set independently of y . Here we have to address the admissibility of the distribution of money holdings, , relative to y.
After describing admissibility, we show how to convert the current problem with counterfeiting into a standard one. The optimal problem can be stated in various ways, as di¤erent series of sub-problems, where, for example, the planner could choose 1 2 [0; 1], the quantity of …at money, and then optimize with respect y, and then "market forces"choose 2 according to incentive constraints. We prefer to present the problem as choosing …rst the intensive and extensive margins-that is, the point mass 0 and the "price" y-and then look for equilibrating 1 and 2 . We then examine if the implied allocation satis…es the participation constraints (2) and (3).
We say that a margin ( 0 ; y) is admissible if there exists ( 1 ; 2 ) and ! such that [( 0 ; 1 ; 2 ); y; !] satis…es the stationarity requirement (1) and implementability requirement (4), where 1 ; 2 0. In the standard monetary environment, ( 0 ; y) de…nes a unique allocation. In our problem, the inclusion of " !" in the description of outcomes is important because ! helps to describe the in ‡ow of counterfeits and their costs. One has to check, therefore, whether an arbitrary ( 0 ; y) is admissible. In particular, there must exist an ! such that (i) is a probability measure that satis…es (1); and (ii) (w; v) satisfy both (4) and the Bellman equation associated with ( 0 ; y). The following lemmas explains how the critical cost of producing a counterfeit, !, can be determined for a given ( 0 ; y). We shall present the Bellman equation in a way that facilitates proving these lemmas. 
and
where a, b, and c are continuous and increasing functions described below.
The inequality (9) assures that the 2 given by (1) Let admissible ( 0 ; y) be the margin of allocation ( ; y; !). We say that ( 0 ; y) is implementable if ( ; y; !) is implementable. Hence implementability of a margin requires existence of an allocation that, in addition to the admissibility requirements, yields nonnegative discounted utilities and satis…es the producer's and consumer's participation constraints (2) and (3). We now show how to verify the satisfaction of these participation constraints in a simple way.
Lemma 3
Suppose that an allocation ( ; y; !) yields nonnegative discounted utilities and its margin is admissible. This allocation is implementable if and only if
where d is a continuous function to be described below. The Bellman equation has the standard structure satisfying a contractionmapping property: when an allocation ( ; y; !) is …xed, current discounted utilities are given by the utility ‡ow corresponding to the …xed allocation, and by future discounted utilities, discounted by . A unique solution (w; v) is therefore associated to the …xed ( ; y; !). Instead of solving for (w; v) we choose below a more tractable algebra that solves the Bellman equation for the di¤erences i v i v 0 , for i = 1; 2, which su¢ ces for checking admissibility and implementability.
We start by showing how the solution for 2 is used to produce the requirement (10) , expressing the consistency between 2 and ! by the way of (1) and (4).
The following notation will be useful: k R ! 0 !dF and f F ( !). The discounted utility w 2 is related to v 2 and 2 according to
The discounted utility w 0 is related to k, f , v 0 and 2 according to
We now derive explicit expressions for the value function v. Starting with the discounted utility v 1 ,
Since
where
Finally, the discounted utility v 0 can be represented as
Subtracting (16) from (14), and recognizing that (1 )
Similarly, subtracting (16) from (15), we get
Now, subtracting (19) from (17) we get
Rearranging terms we get
which implies that 1 > 2 for 2 > 0. Substituting for (1 ) 1 from equation (17), into the above, we get
If we multiply both sides of the above equation by 1 +m 0 and use equation (20) to substitute out for 1 on the right-hand side, we get
(21) In order to derive equation (10), let us use the notation.
Since, from (4)
we can rewrite the above equation as
Note that (22) is a function of both m 0 and m 1 . We will be able to use (1) and the restriction 0 + 1 + 2 = 1 to eliminate m 1 from this equation, provided that the nonnegativity condition (9) holds. Recognizing that m i = i =N , from equation (1), m 1 can be written as
Substituting (23) into (22) and rearranging, we get
We can rewrite the above equation as
Letting now
equation (10) follows. The proof of Lemma 1 is thus complete. Note that (10) was derived using only value functions and equations (1) and (4). We now prove Lemma 2. If y = 0, then a nonnegative solution to the Bellman equation exists only if ! = 0 (and thus w i = v i = 0 for all i). Since c = 0 for y = 0, the proof is trivial in this case. Let us assume now that y > 0, so that c > 0. Letting
equation (10) can be compactly represented as h ( !) = g ( !).
Claim 1 h is increasing, continuous, h(0) = 0, h(!) 0 for ! 0, and h(+1) = +1.
Proof. The proof follows from the assumed continuity of F in the benchmark case, from the the de…nition of h, and from the fact that a + b > 1, sincê
Claim 2 g is nondecreasing, with g(0) > 0 and g(+1) < +1.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that c > 0 for y > 0, and that F has …nite mean.
The properties of h and g demonstrated above implies that the equation h(!) = g(!) has at least one solution on R + , and, generically, an odd number of solutions.
If We now prove Lemma 3. We …rst derive the expression (11) for the participation constraint for producers (2) , and then show that it implies the participation constraint for consumers. Let us write down the participation constraint for producers in terms of ( 0 ; y; !).
For convenience, let x m 0 ; recall that
Consider now the weighted sum
Let us take a closer look at the f g term;
Now we have
Since N m 0 = m 1 + m 2 , the participation constraint becomes
Note that
from the ‡ow equation
Substituting (26), (27) and (28) into (25) we get, after some algebra,
which de…nes the expression for inequality (11) . The proof of Lemma 3 is now complete. We now show that satisfaction of (11) implies satisfaction of the participation constraint for consumers, (3). These inequalities assure that trade provides a nonnegative ‡ow of expected utility. In the case of the producer, it is equivalent to v 0 w 0 , as the Bellman equation shows. That is, v 0 is bounded below by the option of not producing, which provides discounted utility w 0 . Likewise, buyers holding genuine money, face the lower bound v 1 w 1 , while those holding counterfeits face v 2 w 2 . In addition, as demonstrated above,
so that, the relevant inequality in (3) is u (w 1 w 0 ), which is equivalent to v 1 w 1 . Since w 1 = v 1 , it su¢ ces to show that v 0 w 0 -which is the producer participation constraint-implies v 1 0-which would satisfy the consumer participation constraint. Since
So if w 0 0-which implies v 0 0 by the producer participation constraint-then v 1 0-which means the consumer participation constraint is satis…ed. So all we need to demonstrate is that w 0 is nonnegative. From the Bellman condition (13), we have
( ! !) dF 0, which means that w 0 0. We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 1.
Since F (!) > 0 for all ! > 0, then any implementable allocation must feature 2 > 0 unless y = ! = 0. Since u is concave and u 0 (0) = +1 then, for a …xed 0 , any y positive but su¢ ciently small satis…es the producer participation constraint (29). (Note that We now investigate the relationship between ! and ( 0 ; y). Sincê a =^ 1
For a …xed (!; y) then > 0. Now, if is su¢ ciently high and the participation constraint for producers can be ignored then optimality requires that for a …xed ( 0 ; y) the smallest solution (if there is more than one) to h(!) = g(!) is chosen. For such !, the function h cuts the function g from below so that, given these derivatives, ; y ), the proof follows.
A2 Degeneracy and the proof of Proposition 2
We now assume that all individuals draw the same ! =! > 0. There are three kinds of candidates for the optimum. The …rst candidate optimum has ! <!, so that 2 = 0 and ( 0 ; y) solves a "relaxed problem," which is described in appendix A3, below. The second candidate optimum has ! =! with 2 = 0. The ( 0 ; y) from the second candidate will (probably) not solve the relaxed problem; that is, the solution to the relaxed problem will generate a ! >!, which implies that everyone without money will counterfeit. The best way to think about the second candidate is that it solves the relaxed problem subject to the additional constraint that ! !.
The third candidate optimum has ! >! and F ( !) = 1. This is possible provided that the nonnegativity constraints for and (w; v) are satis…ed. The former imposes an upper bound on 0 given by 0 to ensure a nonnegative , (e.g., it follows that if 0 = , then 2 = 1 and 1 = 0, and that 1 > 0 only if 0 < ). The latter imposes lower bounds on the values for ( 0 ; y) to ensure that ! >!. Although the allocations of the third-candidate kind must satisfy additional constraints that the two other kinds of candidates do not and there is a welfare loss associated with counterfeiting, one would think that the planner would never choose this kind of allocation. We are, however, unable to prove that the third candidate optimum is dominated in welfare terms by either of the …rst two candidate optima. The di¢ culty here is due to the fact that, as shown below, for a …xed , the right-hand side of the participation constraint for producers, (2), increases by ! when counterfeiting is introduced. An increase in ! beyond ! has two e¤ects that cannot, in principle, be unambiguously ranked. Thus it is possible that the constraint (2) changes from active to inactive as ! is raised from!. Using the characterization provided by the remark (on the relaxed problem) below, a su¢ cient condition for optimality of allocations of the …rst kind is that the restriction ! ! is not binding, where ! is computed according to the Bellman equations with 0 = 1 = 1 2 and u 0 (y) = 1. Due to continuity, reductions in the value of! below a threshold imply that the optimum becomes of the second kind.
The value for ! in equation (7) follows from the condition h ( !) = g ( !) derived above, say equation (22), after f = 1 and k =! are imposed. Likewise, the inequality for y results from (29).
The proof for the …rst part of Proposition 2 is straightforward. If ! 1, then from (7), ! ! 0, and, hence,! > !, for su¢ ciently high. Similarly, if ! 0, then, from (8), y ! ! and from (7), ! ! !; hence,! > !.
To complete the proof (for the second part of proposition 2), note that the restrictions on follows from (1) and (9) . Provided that ! >! , the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions for implementability follows from Lemma 3.
A3
The relaxed planner's problem 
If, in addition, is su¢ ciently high, then the optimum features 0 = 1 2 and u 0 (y) = 1.
The representation (30) of the planner's objective function, as well as the derivation of the constraint (31), have been derived elsewhere (see Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) and Cavalcanti and Nosal (forthcoming)) for the basic case without counterfeiting. The derivation of inequality (31) for the basic case follows by imposing 2 = 0, using the Bellman equations to solve for w 1 w 0 as a function of 0 and y, and then obtaining an expression for the producer's constraint (11) precisely as (31). The su¢ ciency of (31) for implementability follows because F ( !) = 0 is a necessary condition for optimality when ! L is large, as discussed below, and because (11) implies (2) and (3), according to Lemma 3. Since u 0 (+1) = 0 then u(y) < y and welfare falls below zero if y is suf…ciently large. Since the welfare associated to autarky is zero, the planner's problem can be restricted, without loss of generality, to bounded output and bounded discounted utilities. As a result, if F (! L ) = 0 for ! L su¢ ciently high, then an optimum must feature a ! such that F ( !) = 0. We now show that (29) is equivalent to (31) when F ( !) = 0.
Imposing F ( !) = 0 in the condition h( !) = g( !) above provides a solution ! = and then proceed with the substitution in order to derive (31). It remains to be shown a description of the optimum when is su¢ ciently large. It follows that (31) is slack when 0 = 1 2 , y is such that u 0 (y) = 1 and approaches one. The proof of the claim is now complete.
As a …nal remark, consider the relaxed problem together with the additional constraint ! !. Consider also the solution ! for h ( !) = g ( !), i.e., equation (10) , when F ( !) = 0, derived above, 
!:
Since does not appear in the objective or in the participation constraint, and since! > 0, it follows that the solution attains a welfare level that is positive and bounded away from zero. By contrast, by Proposition 2, implementable allocations with ! >! and positive counterfeiting features 0 , and thus their extensive margins are driven towards zero when is reduced. Allocations of this kind either fail to become implementable or yield welfare below the allocation without counterfeiting (the relaxed problem with ! !) when is reduced.
